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Abstract 
We sometimes fail unwittingly to do things that we ought to do. And we 
are, from time to time, culpable for these unwitting omissions. We provide 
an outline of a theory of responsibility for unwitting omissions. We 
emphasize two distinctive ideas: (i) many unwitting omissions can be 
understood as failures of appropriate vigilance, and; (ii) the sort of self-
control implicated in these failures of appropriate vigilance is valuable. We 
argue that the norms that govern vigilance and the value of self-control 




Consider the following case: 
Bourbon. As Randy is about to leave his home for the office, Al calls to tell 
him that they are out of bourbon. His regular route to the office takes him 
right by a liquor store, and Randy tells Al he’ll buy some. Between his 
home and the liquor store, Randy starts thinking about a paper he is 
writing on omissions. He continues thinking about his work until he arrives 
at the department, where he realizes that he has forgotten the bourbon.1 
 
Randy’s failure to bring the bourbon is criticizable. When Al can’t make the Old 
Fashioned he’s been craving all day, he’ll blame Randy. The structure of this case 
generalizes to other kinds of omissions. Caretakers forget their kids in the backseat of cars 
(see Amaya, 2013) or fail to observe that they’ve left the stove on (see Ahrens, 2016). Less 																																																								
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expressed in this paper do not reflect the opinions of the other grantees or Florida State University. 
1 Clarke (2014: 164) is the inspiration for the example. Mele (2006), Murray (2017), Graham (2014), and 
Sher (2006) discuss similar cases. 
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dramatically, people forget their keys, forget about meetings, miss exit signs on the 
highway, and forget anniversary or birthday dates. Ordinary practice suggests that many 
instances of these failures merit condemnation or fault-finding. 
 The practice is not puzzling in itself; rather, puzzles arise when one attempts to 
map practice to theory. The problem is that in Bourbon—and relevantly similar cases—the 
offending agent’s conduct lacks all familiar actional and valuative antecedents that might 
ground responsibility. There is no decision, volition, intention, belief, desire, choice, or 
judgment (among other things) that seems to explain the omission. 
 In what follows, we offer part of an outline of a general theory of responsibility for 
these failures.2 We’ll focus on Bourbon, but we think that our account generalizes to other 
cases of unwitting omission. Additionally, we explain why people are motivated to take 
responsibility for some of their unwitting omissions. 
 Our account emphasizes several distinctive ideas. First, many unwitting omissions 
can be understood as failures of appropriate vigilance, i.e., failures to meet some standard 
of information management, given an ability to meet these demands. However, this 
vigilance-focused account raises a puzzle of its own: why are we typically concerned to 
meet sometimes demanding norms of information management? A second idea comes in 
here, namely that self-control of the sort implicated in meeting these standards is of 
particular value to us, both individually and socially. Together, these features account for 
																																																								
2 The notion of responsibility is a multi-headed beast. In this paper, we’re interested in the accountability 
sense of responsibility, where an individual is responsible in the accountability sense only when the 
individual’s conduct makes it appropriate to resent or be indignant toward that individual (see Shoemaker, 
2015). Hence, we are interested in a kind of responsibility implicated in making it appropriate for 
individuals to bear certain Strawsonian reactive attitudes toward one another. In what follows, our use of 
the term ‘responsibility’ tracks this phenomenon. While there are interesting issues surrounding alternative 
kinds of responsibility (such as attributability, answerability, legal responsibility, etc.), we set these aside to 
focus on accountability. Thus, the use of ‘responsibility’ functions as shorthand for ‘the accountability kind 
of responsibility’. 
	 3	
the basic structure of explaining Bourbon-style cases, and it provides a framework readily 
amenable to further elaboration in terms of, for example, specifically moral or other 
forms of blame and fault-finding. 
 In Section 1, we briefly define unwitting omissions and discuss some issues with 
standard explanatory strategies applied to responsibility for these omissions. In Section 2, 
we sketch the details of recent empirical work on the nature of cognitive control. This 
empirical work gives us important insights into the capacity for information management. 
In Section 3, we connect these empirical details to an account of vigilance and specify the 
role that failures of vigilance play in Bourbon-style cases. In Section 4, we explain the 
distinction between culpable and non-culpable unwitting omissions that falls out of the 
vigilance account. In Section 5, we explain what determines the standards of appropriate 
vigilance and why agents agree to live up to these demanding standards. We also claim 
that our account of responsibility in Bourbon-style cases generalizes to all cases of unwitting 
omission. 
 
1. Unwitting omissions 
The term ‘unwitting omission’ refers to failures to act where the agent is unaware of the 
fact that she will fail and is failing to act during the duration of her failure.  Unwitting 
omissions are a species of unintentional omissions, where an unintentional omission is any 
failure of an agent to act or refrain that is not the upshot or result of a relevant intention. 
An unwitting omission is any unintentional omission where the agent is unaware at every 
relevant moment that she will omit and is omitting. 
 Ordinary practice suggests that people are sometimes responsible for their 
unwitting omissions (cf. Murray et al., Forthcoming). This practice does not sit well with 
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control-based accounts of the grounds of responsibility, which are perhaps the most 
common approach to moral responsibility. On control views, attributions of responsibility 
are justified in virtue of an agent’s control being implicated in bringing about the state of 
affairs for which she is responsible.3 The problem is that people do not appear to control 
their unwitting omissions. Omissions of this sort do not stem from decisions or choices; 
instead, these omissions seem to stem from the absence of decision or choice. 
 Responsibility theorists have responded to this problem in several ways. Some 
attempt to explain responsibility for unwitting omissions by tracing the occurrence of 
some unwitting omissions back to a controlled action that then grounds responsibility for 
the subsequent unwitting omission.4 Despite several sophisticated proposals, many suspect 
that tracing accounts of responsibility are inadequate. No proposal seems to offer a fully 
general account of responsibility (Agule, 2016; Shabo, 2015), and the view seems to 
misconstrue the phenomenology of responsibility attribution (Graham, 2014). Other 
theorists, operating within the control-based tradition, argue that responsibility-apt 
unwitting omissions violate some normative epistemic requirement. The offender should 
have been aware either of her omitting or her risk of omitting. This strategy has been 
criticized for failing to explain how an epistemic violation grounds distinctly moral 
appraisal (Sher, 2009: 81-82). Additionally, the view comes with the cost of gesturing at 
some unspecified capacity governed by the normative epistemic requirement. 
 The combined conceptual problems and metaphysical baggage have pushed some 
to abandon the control-based framework entirely. Some explain responsibility for 																																																								
3 This formulation presumes that the objects of responsibility are states of affairs. However, nothing 
substantive hangs on this presumption. We could easily translate this into an action-centered view, where 
an agent is responsible in virtue of her control in acting so as to bring about a certain state of affairs.	
4 For applications of tracing strategies to the problem of responsibility for unwitting omissions, see Timpe 
(2011) and Fischer & Tognazzini (2009).	
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unwitting omissions in terms of the agent’s manifesting an objectionable lack of care 
(Björnsson, 2017; Sripada, 2016; Mason, 2015). However, the Quality of Will views have 
difficulty explaining responsibility for unwitting omissions. Some argue that individuals 
cannot be responsible for unwitting omissions precisely because these individuals do not 
manifest a deficit of care in omitting unwittingly (cf. Sripda, 2015; Rosen, 2008). All of 
these problems have motivated skepticism about the possibility for responsibility for 
unwitting omissions. This option becomes more attractive in light of the aforementioned 
difficulties. One might accept these revisionary conclusions (e.g., Doris, 2018), but we 
think there is a more appealing route forward. 
 In what follows, we present a modified control-based theory that explains 
responsibility for unwitting omissions. Consider this an acknowledgement of partisan flag-
planting. Our hope is that in generating an independently motivated reconstruction of the 
control condition on responsibility, we can devise a solution to the problem of 
responsibility for unwitting omissions that avoids metaphysical hand-waving and deflates 
some of the motivation for adopting alternatives to the control-based theory of 
responsibility. 
 
2. Cognitive control and information management 
As mentioned in Section 1, explanations of responsibility in Bourbon-style cases generally 
begin with some account either of a modification to the awareness condition on 
responsibility or of some way in which Randy (or agents in similar circumstances) displays 
objectionable levels of care in omitting (cf. Sher, 2009; Clarke, 2014: 167; Harman, 2011; 
Guerrero, 2007: 80; Björnsson, 2017; Smith, 2005). 
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 We want to begin in a different spot. On our approach, we start with what we 
know about our cognitive architecture, and in particular, the challenges of information 
management in human beings. From there, we build up to a conceptually robust story 
about responsibility-relevant forms of control. Then, we discuss the kinds of demands we 
can reasonably place on creatures with cognitive architecture like ours. On our account, 
Randy is culpable for his unwitting omission in virtue of failing to be appropriately 
vigilant. Failures of appropriate vigilance are failures to live up to a reasonable demand 
for information management, given the agent’s capacity to do so. In this and the next 
section, we specify what the relevant capacity is and (in Section 5) what these demands for 
information management amount to. 
 Human beings are finite creatures with limited cognitive capacities. Nevertheless, 
human beings must navigate information-rich environments with these strict capacity 
limitations.5 There is no way to apprehend every bit of available information, so the brain 
must determine how to allocate cognitive resources to processing certain kinds of 
information and selecting certain actions at the expense of others. This allocation issue 
presents the brain with two problems given information overload. One is a problem of 
synchronic information processing. Given a variety of immediate conflicting demands, 
how does the brain pick out salient or relevant bits of information? The other problem is 
one of diachronic information processing. Given a variety of plans and commitments, 
how do we structure our activities in a way that allows us to act efficiently without 
straining our severely limited memory or attentional capacities? 																																																								
5 Despite controversy about the source of these limitations, nobody disagrees that there are such limitations. 
Try as hard as you want, you’ll never be able to do two two-digit math problems simultaneously. Whether 
this is a matter of limited metabolic resources, functional limitations, structural limitations, or whatever else 
is irrelevant to our account. 	
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 One way to work around these limitations is to use heuristics that efficiently 
process information in a form that is both ecologically bounded and typically effective. 
There is now strong evidence that our cognitive processing includes a ‘fast’ or ‘hot’ system 
that rapidly processes information and utilizes certain ‘automatic’ or prepotent responses 
to certain informational inputs (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). However, there will be times 
when the prepotent response is suboptimal. In these instances, a ‘slow’ or ‘cold’ system is 
needed to override the automatic system and control the flow of information across 
alternative processing pathways toward some other response. Thus, in situations where 
the automatic response is less than optimal (or perceived to be less than optimal), the cold 
system can induce regulation over information processing that allows for flexible control 
(cf. Cohen, 2017: 7-10 for an overview). 
 There is good evidence that the brain’s computational labor divides along these 
lines, supporting two different processing modes. One mode is habitual and supports 
automatic responses, while the other accounts for slower, controlled responses. This 
division is an optimized arrangement for processors that need to balance speed and 
accuracy efficiently (Kool & Botvinick, 2014). Automatic processing provides speed, 
though the presence of novel stimuli or unique situational demands points to the need for 
the self-control that controlled processing provides.6  
																																																								
6 Many philosophers likely understand this division of computational labor as the division between System-
1 and System-2 processing (sometimes labeled the Dual Process Theory). While the label is useful, many 
cognitive scientists question the System-1/System-2 framework and the presuppositions of that framework. 
Since the original proposal of the two-system division over 40 years ago (Posner and Snyder, 1975), the 
hypothesis has been criticized and significantly revised (see Cohen et al., 1990 for overviews; see Cohen, 
2017 for criticisms). These advancements and revisions, however, do not affect the points that we make 
below. Our view does not depend on any substantive formulation of the Dual Process Theory or a specific 
view on the mechanisms or circuits that realize these information-processing structures or the sorts of 
processes that count as either habitual or controlled are irrelevant to our argument. 
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 The cognitive control system is the main hub of controlled processing (Cohen, 
2017: 4). Roughly, the cognitive control system monitors conflicting demands that are 
made on various cognitive resources. In addition to monitoring, the cognitive control 
system also induces regulation on lower-level processing systems by biasing certain 
processing pathways over others.  
 To see how this works, consider a variant of the Bourbon example, one where 
Randy remembers to get the bourbon. Randy’s various motor movements result from 
automatic responses given the goal of getting to the office. When he sees the liquor store, 
there are conflicting demands: the automatic response to continue moving toward the 
office and the cognitively mediated desire to buy bourbon. Because Randy (in the 
“success” variant of the Bourbon case) wants to get the bourbon for Al, the cognitive 
control system needs to kick in to bias the processing pathways that favor the non-
automatic response.7 
 The issue of managing conflicting demands shows why it is useful for organisms 
like us to have a controlled information-processing system, but it also highlights the 
important functions of the cognitive control system. First, the control system monitors 
conflicting demands from lower-level processing units. Second, the control system stores 
task representations and implements the appropriate one given both expectations about 
future reward balanced against current costs of implementation and relevant 
environmental and situational cues (Shenhav, Botvinick, and Cohen, 2013). This last 
component of cognitive control is important for cases like Bourbon. 																																																								
7 Sometimes, as they say, it’s better to be lucky than to be good. But we want to set aside cases where Randy 
gets lucky and has the relevant thought in some way that is disconnected from any interesting notion of 
cognitive control. We suspect there are interesting things to say if he has the thought because he is hit by a 
stray cosmic ray, or because of the workings of a bourbonic thought induction field of a mad scientist, or 
even the more pedestrian case of a mechanism disconnected from cognitive control. Whatever the proper 
verdict in those cases, however, they are not the phenomenon that is of interest to us. 
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 For example, consider the successful variant of the Bourbon case. While walking, 
Randy is thinking about his paper. When he approaches the store, he needs to shift his 
attention away from the paper (at least for some time) and toward the store. Thus, the 
cognitive resources needed to focus on the paper conflict with the resources needed to 
notice the store and get the bourbon. The cognitive control system monitors this conflict 
and signals for a new task representation to be activated. The appropriate task 
representation is activated and Randy walks into the store. Hence, the cognitive control 
system is needed for activities just like this one: some new stimulus creates a conflict that 
demands the activation and maintenance of a new task representation. 
 This means that cognitive control is a crucial constituent of agential control (see 
Murray, 2017: 517-19). Our sketch of the functional profile of cognitive control glosses 
over a mountain of mechanistic and computational details that have come out over the 
last decade or so. The monitoring, specification, and implementation functions can be 
described in precise computational terms. Many of these computations are derived from 
reinforcement learning paradigms that explain the various components of cost/benefit 
decision-making (Kool, Gershman, and Cushman, 2017). Recent neuroimaging work has 
mapped these computational procedures to underlying mechanisms, such as the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, brain stem 
dopaminergic nuclei, subthalamic nucleus, and locus coeruleus (see Brown, 2017 for an 
overview of the neuroimaging work). For our purposes, however, these details—while 
interesting—are not critical to our discussion of the control condition on responsibility.  
 The previous example simplifies the way in which the cognitive control system 
balances conflicting demands on our limited cognitive resources. In addition to 
monitoring for these sorts of demands, the brain balances various future-oriented 
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commitments that we cannot fulfill all at once. The cognitive control system is also 
engaged in balancing prospective memory with current actional and environmental 
demands (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). Randy has to work all day, get to the liquor store, 
and find his way to the office (among, plausibly, a number of other things). He cannot do 
these all at once, so he plans to do some things later. These prospective memories are 
encoded by the cognitive control system and bound to certain cues the detection of which 
causes signals to be sent that bring the relevant task representations online. 
 Thus, the cognitive control system solves the problem of synchronic and 
diachronic information management mentioned at the outset. These structures and their 
functions point to our unique abilities to balance a variety of competing demands in the 
face of strict limits on attentional and memory capacity. Understanding cognitive control 
at the functional level also tells us something important about the way in which we 
manage informational demands and structure our plans in light of cognitive limitations. 
Given this sort of neural architecture, we claim, there is good evidence that Randy has a 
robust capacity for information management that is implicated in his being called to 
account for his unwitting omission. 
 Some may worry that our account of cognitive control fails to connect up with 
accounts of agential control in philosophically interesting ways. In order to successfully 
recall his plans, for example, Randy’s cognitive control system must kick in. But that 
seems to invite the question of what role Randy himself plays in controlling his cognitive 
control. However, we are offering a partial componential analysis of agential control. The 
cognitive control system partially constitutes agential control. For this kind of deflationary 
account of agency, then, it does not make sense to ask whether Randy controls his 
cognitive control. Our commitment to this deflationary picture stems from assuming a 
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causal theory of action that is compatible with naturalistic accounts of human agency. 
This, we think, is a package of commitments that most control-based theories can 
accommodate (and perhaps willingly embrace). While some may disagree with these 




 Our claim is that Randy is culpable for his unwitting omission in Bourbon because 
he fails to live up to certain reasonable demands for information management and he has 
the capacity to meet these demands. Thus far, we have sketched the lower-level cognitive 
architecture that, we think, underpins the sort of capacity that is at issue in our fault-
finding in cases of omission.8 We take it that the relevant capacity is vigilance, and that 
Randy’s failure of vigilance is partly what explains his responsibility in Bourbon. In this 
section, we explain what the role of vigilance is in our account. 
 Vigilance is a psychological capacity that is partially constitutive of the socially 
salient ability to manage informational demands. Vigilance is a capacity to become 
occurrently aware of morally or prudentially relevant considerations for acting. This 
capacity, then, is crucial for navigating the sorts of information-rich environments that 
moral agents find themselves in. 
																																																								
8 In what follows, we build our account on the presumption of a species-typical neural system. There could 
be either modest departures from this species-typical set-up or localized functional deficits at the 
neurobiological or mechanistic level that raise interesting questions about how culpability interacts with 
shifting environmental conditions. A full theory should have something to say concerning agents with non-
typical cognitive control mechanisms or alternative computational bases for vigilance. However, our 
interest is in ordinary, paradigmatic cases of unwitting omissions, so we are (reluctantly) putting aside those 
intriguing varieties of cases. 
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 The details about the cognitive control system tell us something important about 
the functional profile of vigilance. Recall that the cognitive control system accounts for 
awareness of relevant environmental factors and sensitivity to those environmental 
factors. We take it that vigilance has a similar functional profile, namely that vigilance 
enables agents to be aware of and sensitive to relevant considerations in a context. Thus, 
the account of cognitive control informs the account of vigilance.9  
 Vigilance plays two important roles in an agent’s self-governance. First, it enables 
agents to be aware in the sense of directing attention to action-relevant aspects of one’s 
environment. Second, it enables an agent to be sensitive (to a greater or lesser degree) to 
those relevant aspects in a way that is crucial for practical deliberation. 
 This psychological capacity is structured by an agent’s valuative commitments, 
knowledge, experience, and other dispositions. Having vigilance enables the agent to 
form certain action-relevant representational or motivational states in light of attending to 
relevant considerations (or, in some cases, vigilance enables the agent to manifest certain 
dispositions to form such action-relevant states in appropriate circumstances). 
 Vigilance enables Randy to regulate information in ways that come up to 
standards of information management that govern him in light of his various 
commitments. And possessing vigilance is part of what makes him culpable for not getting 
the bourbon. Thus, because Randy has vigilance, he can be held to account for his 
failures to meet certain demands of information management (supposing, for now, that 
these demands are reasonable).  																																																								
9 There could be alternative, bottom-up kinds of processing relevant to vigilance (see Gadziola & Wesson 
2016). What is important for our account is that there is at least one plausible, coherent story about the 
realization of vigilance in some kind of neural machinery. We do not suggest that it is the only story or the 
full story. So, for example, this is compatible with the idea that agents that lack species-typical neural 
architecture—or have completely different sorts of neurobiological structures—can be vigilant. 
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 There are two components of appropriate vigilance. First, the agent manifests a 
degree of vigilance whereby the agent will detect and properly manage various 
informational demands within a given context. Second, the agent’s manifestation of 
vigilance satisfies some reasonable demand for a certain level of vigilance. Conversely, a 
failure of appropriate vigilance is one where the agent has vigilance, but fails to manifest 
vigilance in a way that meets certain demands. This two-part account explains a bit of 
ambiguity in ordinary vigilance talk. Sometimes, when we talk about being vigilant, we 
are simply referring to the level of vigilance that the agent manifests. In these cases, 
‘vigilance’ functions more like a descriptive term where agents can be vigilant to a degree 
but fail to detect relevant, accessible considerations. On the other hand, being vigilant can 
also refer to the agent’s manifesting a degree of vigilance that meets a reasonable demand 
for vigilance. In these cases, ‘vigilance’ functions more like a success term. 
 The fact that vigilance comes in degrees introduces the possibility of semi-
vigilance. For instance, suppose that, in a variant of Bourbon, Randy promises to bring 
bourbon to the office party. However, when he gets to the store, he remembers to get a 
brown alcohol, but he thinks of scotch rather than bourbon, and so he buys the wrong 
thing. Is Randy criticizable in this case? The issue is complicated, but our approach 
suggests some resources for thinking about the case. 
 Many of the tasks we perform are elaborate and composed of various sub-tasks. 
Further, task demands can be more or less fine-grained. This implies that there are 
varying levels of breakdown in task performance associated with sub-task performance 
and task performance at the appropriate level. Demands on task performance vary 
contextually, affecting the perceived severity of these breakdowns. If the stakes dictate 
that Randy purchase a brown spirit, then scotch might do—even if it isn’t Al’s favorite. 
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But if the circumstances demand Blanton’s, Randy’s bringing scotch might be a more 
serious transgression. Context shapes responsibility for cases of semi-vigilance. 
 Some instances of responsibility-apt vigilance might seem susceptible to problems 
of causal deviance. For instance, consider a different variant on Bourbon, one where 
Randy (falsely) believes that he needs to get scotch for the party, but through 
inattentiveness, buys bourbon instead. Is this a failure of appropriate vigilance? Much of 
the story about responsibility here will turn on how Randy came by his false belief. But 
supposing there’s no failure of appropriate vigilance to account for his false belief, then we 
think Randy is not criticizable in this case of deviance. This, however, has less to do with 
Randy’s vigilance and more to do with the fact that there’s no occasion for criticism in 
the case where Randy shows up at the office with bourbon. 
 We claim that part of what makes Randy responsible for his unwitting omission is 
a failure of appropriate vigilance. That is, there is a failure of information management 
given a demand to properly manage information. The discussion of vigilance and 
cognitive control gives us good reason to believe that Randy has the sort of capacity 
needed to meet these demands. In the next section, we argue that a plausible story of the 
difference between culpable and non-culpable unwitting omission falls out of the vigilance 
account. 
 
4. Culpable and non-culpable unwitting omission 
To see the difference between culpable and non-culpable omission, compare the Bourbon 
case to a different omission case. Suppose that  
Lottery. Faye is down on her luck, broke, and recently unemployed. Faye 
needs money to support her family. She passes by a store while walking 
down the street. Had she walked into this store, she would have been the 
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millionth customer and won a huge cash prize.10 Unfortunately, from 
Faye’s vantage point, she cannot discern this.  
It seems that Faye is not criticizable for failing to win the prize (even though she could 
easily do so) because her successfully doing so would be a matter of mere luck.11 And 
what makes it the case that her winning is a matter of mere luck is that she is ignorant 
about the contest. 
 The difference between Randy and Faye is that Randy, but not Faye, should have 
been more vigilant. This implies that others can justifiably criticize Randy for substandard 
information management. This does not seem true of Faye. Perhaps for some sense of 
‘should’ it is the case that she should have been more vigilant. But that use of ‘should have 
been vigilant’ seems importantly different from the use that describes Randy’s situation. 
 Perhaps the most plausible story about the norms at issue (part of what makes it 
true that Randy should have been more vigilant) is to understand them as special 
obligations that derive from commitment-oriented relationships. Both Randy and Faye 
have special obligations to their friends or family in virtue of being in certain relationships 
with those people. Those relationships entail adopting certain commitments oriented 
toward the other person in the relationship. Some of these commitments entail 
obligations to direct attention or privilege the distribution of attentional resources toward 
caring for the other person in the relationship. Thus, Randy, in virtue of being a friend, 
has certain commitments oriented toward Al that include being obligated to attend to Al 
in particular ways. Faye has these commitments as well, but certain properties of the 																																																								
10 This is based on a case in Zimmerman (1986: 205). 
11 The inference here relies on a simple blame-implies-can principle (cf. Buckwalter & Turri, 2015; Henne 
et al., 2016). If S is blameworthy for A-ing, then S can avoid bringing it about the A-ing occurs in virtue of 
her agency. If S can avoid bringing it about that A occurs in virtue of her agency, then whether A-ing 
occurs in virtue of her agency is not a matter of luck. Hence, if A-ing occurs as a matter of luck, then S is 
not blameworthy for A-ing. We rely on the idea that individuals cannot be held to account for occurrences 
outside their control. If an occurrence is a matter of luck, then whether there is such an occurrence lies 
beyond the agent’s control. 
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epistemic context releases her from these obligations. Randy’s epistemic context does not 
share these properties, and so he remains bound to these special obligations to Al. This is 
what makes it the case that Randy should have been more vigilant. 
 Faye needs to get money to support her family, but she cannot determine that 
walking into the store would help her achieve this goal. The upshot of the case is that 
Faye is not obligated to walk into the store, but this is because of a defect in the epistemic 
context. Thus, it is not the case that Faye should have been vigilant because she could not 
have been vigilant. 
 We take it that Randy could have known better (in some relevant sense of ‘could’) 
because he has vigilance. By this, we mean that Randy is able to generate or come to 
have action-appropriate attitudes. Randy has this ability in virtue of possessing vigilance, 
and that capacity is subserved by the usual sorts of cognitive control structures. 
 From the standpoint of ordinary talk about capacities and abilities, this should 
seem unremarkable. Alas, accounts of capacities are as fraught as anything in philosophy. 
For our purposes, we’ll help ourselves to two assumptions: (1) there are useful ways of 
talking about capacities that are compatible with most ways of understanding the 
ontology of action, and; (2) our talk of capacities or abilities is disjointed, reflecting 
different practical and theoretical interests. Some notions of capacity reflect an interest in 
explanation and prediction. Other notions of capacity reflect different concerns—e.g., 
standards of evaluation in a social practice. Whether a dam is capable of holding back a 
flood, for example, involves a notion of capacity structured by an interest in prediction. 
Whether someone has the ability to meet a deadline for submitting a paper involves more 
than prediction. Indeed, one might predict that this particular author is exceedingly 
unlikely to turn the paper in on time. In each case, the relevant notion of capacity turns 
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on facts about the target of evaluation (the dam and the damned author). However, each 
involves a different set of concerns that pick out some different notions of capacity. Our 
presumption is that where there are interests in coordinating and organizing social 
practices, talk of an agent’s capacities will oftentimes come apart from the kinds of 
capacities we will attribute to phenomena where our only interest is in prediction and 
explanation. We trust that both assumptions—that talk of capacities is compatible various 
ways of carving up the ontology of action and that capacity talk is disjointed in light of 
diverse practical and theoretical interests—are plausible enough on their face. Anyway, 
recapitulating familiar debates in the philosophy of action and some versions of the free 
will problem would take us far afield, so we set those concerns aside. With respect to the 
disunification thesis, what follows may resolve some questions. 
 Recall that manifestations of vigilance consist in, for example, the agent’s coming 
to have relevant attitudes formed in light of the agent’s attending to relevant 
considerations. This helps to explain part of the story about Randy. Randy fails to 
manifest appropriate vigilance. He could have formed (but failed to form) some belief that 
he needed to get liquor or a desire to go into the store in light of the consideration that he 
promised to get some for Al. This consideration is the object of Randy’s vigilance because 
it is relevant for him in this circumstance. 
 In contrast, Faye cannot manifest appropriate vigilance because the environment 
is not configured in a way that supports vigilance. Randy, on the other hand, is situated in 
an environment that supports vigilance, because the normatively relevant features of the 
environment are accessible to Randy. That is, because Randy has vigilance, he can 
deliberately or spontaneously bring to mind the normative reasons that rationalize his 
acting in accordance with his obligations toward Al. This makes clear what it means to 
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say that Randy’s reasons are accessible to him. An agent that is ignorant with respect to 
normatively relevant features of some situation can access the reasons given by those 
normatively relevant features in virtue of being vigilant with respect to those normatively 
relevant features of the situation. 
 We need to be careful not to over-generalize the features of vigilance, however. 
Someone might wonder why Faye cannot be vigilant with respect to considerations that 
bear on the cash prize. The reason she cannot, we think, is that there was never a time 
(we suppose) when she had the relevant information or was in a position to gain the 
relevant information. Faye does not exhibit a failure of information maintenance that 
seems crucial to vigilance. Randy, on the other hand, does exhibit a failure to maintain 
relevant information. This maintenance does not require Randy to hold the relevant 
information within the scope of occurrent awareness; rather, information maintenance 
requires appropriate memory encoding and utilizing cues that increases the likelihood of 
recall at the right time (e.g., writing a note, setting a reminder on your phone, etc.). 
 At this stage, the issue of moral luck appears to rear its head. After all, aren’t the 
subpersonal occurrences necessary for vigilance a matter of luck? And, if they are, how 
can Randy be responsible for failures of vigilance? We accept that there is an interesting 
challenge here, and that in some form or another the question can be pressed against 
nearly any deflationary, causal, control-based account of responsibility. 
 Like most control theorists, we don’t think luck is fatal to responsibility. Control 
theorists can and have addressed the challenge of luck (e.g., Vargas, 2012; Hartman, 
2016). Second, we are inclined to think that the discussion in the next section of the value 
of self-control can be understood as highlighting a good that (in the ordinary case) can only 
be attained if we tolerate some amount of luck. That said, given that our present ambition 
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is to tell a story about unwitting omissions that is continuous with control-based theories 
of responsibility, we are content to let our account ride or fall on the more general 
resources of control-based accounts for addressing questions of luck. 
 Here, then, is where we are: the notion of vigilance helps to explain why Randy is 
culpable for his omission in Bourbon. This also explains what happens with other cases of 
unwitting omission. Randy’s case highlights certain dimensions of the monitoring aspects 
of vigilance, though other kinds of unwitting omission highlight different dimensions. For 
instance, failures of vigilance might explain underbelief, false belief, or failures of 
inference. And when these failures of vigilance are connected to the special obligations 
that derive from commitment-oriented relationships, culpability for these failures will 
have a similar explanation to the one described above. 
  
5. Competence and Self-Control 
We have, thus far, explained the way in which Randy possesses a capacity relevant to 
meeting certain demands. Because Randy has vigilance (but fails to manifest appropriate 
degrees of vigilance), he can be held to account for his omission. The core feature of this 
account so far appeals to vigilance, a person-level capacity that enables control over 
monitoring, implementing intentions, and regulating temporally extended action. 
 An important puzzle remains: What makes it the case that certain demands for 
information management are reasonable? And why is it that agents accept that standard 
as binding on their conduct? When Randy fails to be vigilant, presumably there is a story 
to be told about his failure, a story that reflects the operations of his neurological, 
cognitive, and affective architecture. But why view the outcome of those things—things 
that are, let us suppose, determinative in Randy’s failure—as licensing criticism of Randy? 
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A satisfactory account must specify why the demands implicitly encoded in our 
responsibility ascriptions of unwitting wrongdoers are reasonable. We think that an 
answer is forthcoming if we focus on the value of self-control. 
 Many philosophers have noted that self-control or self-governance is central to 
responsible agency (Ekstrom, 2000; Roskies, 2010; Fischer and Ravizza, 1998; Vargas, 
2013a). On many such accounts, what makes an individual a morally responsible agent is 
(at least in part) the general capacity to direct oneself in light of distinctively moral reasons 
for acting. Perhaps the standard way to flesh out this general capacity is in terms of an 
agent’s (or some mechanism’s) responsiveness to reasons (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998; 
Nelkin, 2011; Roskies, 2012; McKenna, 2013; Vargas, 2013a). According to these 
accounts, reasons-responsiveness is at least necessary (if not sufficient) for responsible 
agency. But why is self-control important in the domain of responsible agency? 
 Put simply, self-control matters because it concerns the ability to conform one’s 
behavior to norms that arise as a result of one’s conception of the person one is and hopes 
to be (and in turn that others reasonably expect one to be). In cases where one is who one 
hopes to be, two things are true: one has certain competencies that (at least partly) 
constitute one’s being that person and one reliably manifests those competencies in one’s 
behavior. So, if one is (and wants to be) a loving parent, one has the ability to be sensitive 
to the needs of one’s child and the wellbeing of that child and one reliably manifests or 
acts on those abilities. Self-control matters since it reflects the extent to which one actively 
seeks to, and succeeds in, conforming behavior to the self that one aims to be, and thus (to 
some extent) is. In the remainder of this section, we expand this account of the 
relationship between self-conception, competence, reliability, and self-control. 
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 One’s self-conception includes elements such as the relationships that one deems 
important, the projects that one finds fulfilling, and the activities that one esteems.12 
Despite localized or temporary fluctuations, in the ordinary case, one’s self-conception at 
a time (or over a minimal range of times) expresses many of the values, carings, and 
aspirations of a given agent at that time (or across that range of times). 
 Part of the content of one’s self-conception is an awareness of special skills or 
capacities that are necessary to manifest one’s overall scheme of cares. These capacities 
are important in at least three ways (cf. Schapiro, 2001). First, they play an important 
relational function. Our distinctive capacities relate us to the world in a way that reflects 
the kind of person we aim to be. Second, they play an instrumental role, in that exercises 
of these capacities bring about the activities that we esteem and realize the projects that 
we deem fulfilling. Third, our capacities play a revelatory role, in that exercising our 
capacities reveals to others certain features of our self-conception. As such, our capacities 
play a crucial role in helping us live up to and realize our aspirations and ambitions. 
 Such capacities require or perhaps define a sphere of competence that ranges over 
a set of actions in which we can reliably engage.13 Thus, in virtue of one’s self-conception 
one takes oneself to have certain capacities that one can reliably exercise to bring about 
certain outcomes. If, for instance, part of one’s self-conception includes being a reliable 
																																																								
12 Of course, one’s self-conception will include much more than this. Perhaps one’s self-conception divides 
into normative and descriptive elements. If that is the case, then the aspects of one’s self-conception that are 
important for this paper are the normative elements. Also, the notion of ‘self’ at issue here likely varies 
cross-culturally, as Heine, Lehman, Markus and Kitayama (1999) suggest. 
13 Amaya & Doris (2014: 258-260) also discuss an agent’s “zone of secure competence” with respect to 
similar cases (what we call ‘unwitting omissions’ they call ‘performance mistakes’; as far as we can tell, 
performance mistakes appear to be a subclass of unwitting omission). However, Amaya and Doris claim 
that normative competences constitute the zone of secure competence, and equate these normative 
competences with appropriately reasons-responsive mechanisms. Our discussion of competence provides a 
fuller characterization (we think) of what these normative competences are, how they link up with other 
aspects of our psychology, and why these competences are considered normative. 
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teacher or a reliable parent, then some of the act-types that fall within one’s sphere of 
competence will include activities that fall under those roles.  
 Competence, here, is a function of the degree of reliability that one manifests in 
undertaking certain activities. Thus, there is an important relationship between self-
conception, competence, and reliability. The central connection is that we want to display 
reliability in those domains where we value competence (where it fits into our ideal self-
conception). Our valuing such competence also signals to others that we desire to be 
assessed in light of the norms that attach to occupying particular roles, the expectations 
that these norms generate, and the demands from others that they invite. 
 When people make mistakes (and unwitting omissions are a subset of mistakes), 
they violate demands that emerge because the agent occupies certain roles. Where an 
agent regards the demands as unreasonable, the demands can be protested. Plausibly, 
demands are unreasonable in at least two circumstances. The first is when the agent 
defensibly resists occupying that role. If I am terrible at navigating, then my travel 
companions have no business expecting me to lead them on a tour through a foreign city. 
If they have such expectations, and blame my failure of leadership, I can reasonably 
object to their placing me in such a role. The second is when one’s circumstances contain 
systematic, competence-defeating features. If I am in fact a good navigator, but I falsely 
believe we are in Brussels rather than Amsterdam, or I am being coerced at gunpoint to 
lead the group down a blind alley, then my competencies are being defeated or 
undermined by external forces. Other things equal, the unreasonableness of a demand in 
either sort of circumstance gives me an excuse for certain kinds of failure.14   
																																																								
14 Of course, there will be some question as to how we sort out the excusing kinds of ignorance from the 
non-excusing kinds, though some of that machinery will derive from a more systematic account of the 
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 Where the demands are reasonable, however, there are two primary responses to 
mistakes that are available. Either the community must adjust its expectations of the 
agent (e.g., I am not a good navigator after all) or the agent merits blame (Higgins, 1997). 
There is oftentimes a high social cost to signaling to others that one lacks the relevant 
competence. So, individuals are ordinarily motivated to live up to these expectations, and 
to accept negative assessments in light of failures to meet these expectations (Miller & 
Monin, 2016). Accepting a negative assessment is an important signal to the community. 
In a costly fashion, it communicates that one takes oneself to have the relevant 
competence that figures in the demand, even if one did not (or could not) successfully 
exercise the capacity in the criticized case (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong, 1985). 
 This helps us to see the personal significance of competence. Because agents desire 
to exhibit competence, individuals have an interest in manifesting reliability in those 
domains they find valuable. Put another way, agents have an interest in manifesting their 
reliability to themselves and others for the sake of demonstrating that they can be 
considered reliant. When individuals make mistakes in domains of personal importance, 
there is a prima facie threat to that individual’s self-conception in virtue of the threat to that 
individual’s claim to reliability in a particular domain. One way to defuse this threat is to 
take responsibility for mistakes. In taking responsibility (either moral or non-moral) for 
some mistake, an individual signals both to herself and others that she possesses the 
relevant competence (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Acknowledging a failure to exercise this 
competence, even when it is seemingly costly, nevertheless affirms the agent’s competence 
																																																																																																																																																																					
norms of vigilance. In spite of this problem, it remains true that there are relatively clear-cut examples of 
ignorance that make a demand unreasonable and thereby furnishes the agent with an excuse. 
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in that domain. Hence, the sphere of competence helps to explain why individuals would 
agree to take responsibility for their mistakes. 
 Importantly, mistakes only threaten one’s self-conception (and thus become 
something for which an agent might take responsibility) when the mistake threatens the 
claim to reliability. If an agent already has a solid reputation for reliability, then 
individual mistakes will not constitute a threat. For example, if Christen Press makes a 
bad run or LeBron James throws a bad pass, nobody will question their competence as 
professional athletes (readers can feel free to substitute in the names of their favorite 
professional athletes to test these intuitions). Systematic displays of unreliability or 
relatively grave singular lapses, however, will threaten even the maximally competent 
agent (e.g., don’t miss all your writing deadlines or word might get out that you aren’t, in 
fact, competent at participation in this kind of endeavor!) At bottom, then, the agent’s 
claim to reliability is the foundation for the normative account of expectations and 
demands that we offer here. 
 An agent’s sphere of competence—whether the agent is a master of that domain, 
as it were—is crucial for self-control. As we see it, one possesses self-control to the degree 
that one’s behavior falls within one’s sphere of competence. By extension, one counts as a 
responsible agent only to the degree that one is acting within one’s sphere of competence. 
This implies (virtuously, we presume) that self-control and responsible agency are highly 
context-sensitive and shift according to one’s movement into and out of one’s sphere of 
competence (Vargas, 2013b). 
 All of this supports our contention that self-control plays a valuable role in our 
lives. These considerations lead us to a normatively significant account of self-control in 
terms of the possession of capacities that figure into our self-conception and constitute a 
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sphere of competence. On this account, we are in control of ourselves and what we do 
simply in virtue of possessing these capacities in a context where nothing blocks or 
significantly impedes the proper exercise of these capacities.15  
 In this way, we think that the competence account explains why certain demands 
for information management are reasonable. It also explains why agents accept these 
demands and accept criticism when they fall short of these demands (absent the possession 
of some excuse). And our account reflects the context- and interest-sensitivity of these 
norms, suggesting that what counts as a reasonable demand varies greatly across a variety 
of contexts and between various individuals.  
 Putting all the pieces together, Randy is responsible for his omission in Bourbon 
because he possesses certain capacities that enable him to get the bourbon—capacities 
that make a general interpersonal bourbon-getting demand reasonable in his particular 
case, given his saying he would do so—and he was acting within a domain of 
competence, thereby making the particular demand reasonable. Insofar as Randy is a 
responsible agent moving within a sphere of competence while he unwittingly omits, he is 
responsible for failing to get the bourbon. 
 Briefly, we want to explain the generalizability of our account. According to many 
different theories of omissions, an agent does not omit to do something unless there is 
some operative norm (understood broadly) that calls for the agent to do (or avoid doing) 																																																								
15 While our discussion of competence is indebted to Raz’s (2011) account, we depart from him in 
significant ways. One notable way is that Raz’s account of competence focuses entirely on the agent’s beliefs 
about her competence and self-conception. Some have criticized Raz’s account on just this point (see, e.g., 
Watson, 2016) since it seems that agents can be and are deceived (perhaps systematically) about the abilities 
that they have and the degree to which agents can reliably exercise these abilities (see Kruger & Dunning, 
1999). Our account, however, avoids this criticism. While we incorporate agential beliefs into our story, we 
think that de facto reliability is more fundamental. While beliefs about one’s abilities and competence has 
some downward influence on de facto reliability, empirical research suggests that beliefs cannot account for 
the full range of facts about agential competence and reliability (see Protzko & Aronson, 2016; Flore & 
Wicherts, 2015). In this way, we take it that our account of competence is better suited to the empirical facts 
than Raz’s account. 
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that thing (cf. Murray, 2018; McGrath, 2005; Clarke, 2014; Henne, Pinillos, and De 
Brigard, 2017). Thus, any instance of an omission entails norm violation. Part of the 
content of these norms will include various demands about the allocation of attentional 
resources (i.e., they demand a certain level of vigilance). By definition, an unwitting 
omission occurs without the agent’s being aware that she will omit or is omitting to 
behave in some way. So, for any unwitting omission, there will be a lack of awareness 
(failure of vigilance) that results in (or constitutes) the violation of a norm (part of the 
content of which is some reasonable demand for a level of vigilance). These are features 
of unwitting omissions cases generally, so the core aspects of our account will hold for any 
instance of an unwitting omission. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that Randy is criticizable for his unwitting omission in Bourbon in virtue 
of failing to be appropriately vigilant. Failures of appropriate vigilance are those where an 
agent manifests substandard vigilance, where standards of vigilance are determined by 
the content of reasonable demands made on our cognitive resources. We have also 
argued that the content of these demands are binding on us in virtue of wanting to 
manifest reliability within certain domains of competence. 
 We take our account to be a descriptive project or, insofar as it is normative, the 
account is independent of any substantive, first-order normative commitments. To be 
sure, there are complex questions lurking here about why characteristically moralizing 
responses—e.g., blame, condemnation, sanction—are appropriate or licensed. On these 
matters, there are a variety of accounts of moral responsibility that strike us as broadly 
compatible with the kinds of considerations advanced here (see Darwall, 2006; Vargas, 
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2013-a; McKenna, 2012; Nelkin, 2011; McGeer, 2015; Fricker, 2016). We think our 
descriptive project can be extended in various ways based on overarching views about the 
foundations of moral responsibility. 
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